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The Economic Effects of Earnings Management Pre- and Post-SOX 
 
Abstract While prior research suggests that firms have primarily switched from accrual to real 
earnings management strategies since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
(Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008), there has been limited research on the effects that this switch might 
have on future performance and firm value. Accrual earnings management shifts income 
recognition without directly affecting cash flows, whereas real earnings management implies 
suboptimal decisions that directly affect the underlying cash flows. Thus, this shift in earnings 
management techniques could have important consequences for investors. Consistent with 
increased real earnings management post-SOX, we find that abnormal operating decisions are 
less informative about future return on assets (ROA) and have a more negative effect on firm 
value relative to the pre-SOX period. Alternatively, consistent with less accrual earnings 
management post-SOX, we find that discretionary accruals are more informative about future 
ROA and there is less evidence of market mispricing relative to the pre-SOX period. Finally, we 
examine the net effect that SOX has had on earnings management and find that the lower future 
returns and firm performance associated with greater real earnings management outweigh the 
positive effects of improved accrual quality. 
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The Economic Effects of Earnings Management Pre- and Post-SOX 
1 Introduction 
A major objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was to restore investor 
confidence in the financial reporting process by curbing accounting manipulation. While 
research finds that income-increasing discretionary accrual activity declined after the passage of 
SOX, several studies suggest that efforts to boost earnings by altering “real” activities increased 
after SOX (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008, Bartov and Cohen 2009). However, these two forms of 
earnings management have very different implications for future firm performance. Whereas 
accrual earnings management (AEM) shifts income across periods with no direct effect on cash 
flows, real earnings management (REM) involves operating decisions that alter cash flows in a 
way that presumably sacrifices long-run value (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). Given the 
apparent shift in earnings management strategies, we consider the economic consequences of 
REM and AEM before and after SOX. Specifically, are managers more willing to sacrifice firm 
value for short-term gain, and how does the market perceive this change in discretionary 
activity? Our study addresses these issues by investigating how the long-term implications and 
investor pricing of real activities management and discretionary accruals change after the 
passage of SOX. 1  
An extensive body of research suggests that some managers acting in their own self-
interest affect reported earnings to mislead stakeholders or alter contractual outcomes.2 Most of 
those studies focus on managers pushing the boundaries of GAAP by exercising discretion over 
                                                          
1 Although the enhanced internal control evaluation and CEO/CFO certification requirements of SOX likely affected 
a manager’s mindset regarding earnings management, like Cohen et al. (2008), we recognize that concurrent events 
could have contributed to a change in earnings management strategies. We similarly emphasize the role of SOX and 
refer to the “post-SOX” period but acknowledge that investor skepticism following the accounting scandals and 
regulatory scrutiny and enforcement actions could help to explain our results.   
2 See Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (2000) for further discussion and review of literature. 
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the accrual component of earnings. This manipulation obfuscates to some extent the 
informational value of accounting estimates and judgments embedded in accruals that otherwise 
provide a better reflection of economic events and a better signal of future profitability 
(Subramanyam 1996; Xie 2001). Alternatively, the real earnings management literature suggests 
that managers opportunistically affect reported earnings through certain operating, investing and 
financing decisions to obtain some short-term benefit (Bartov 1993, Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen 
and Zarowin 2010, Zang 2012). These transactions or activities presumably deviate from what 
otherwise would be a value maximizing strategy. In support of that view, Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005) survey over 400 chief financial officers (CFOs) and document their willingness 
to sacrifice long-term value in order to avoid the immediate stock market penalty that results 
from reporting lackluster earnings. 
Cohen et al. (2008) contend that a rash of accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, Adelphia 
Communications and Worldcom) and greater regulatory oversight that culminated in the 2002 
passage of SOX increased the marginal cost of opportunistic AEM. The increased threat of 
penalties and reputational costs associated with detection of accounting manipulations disrupted 
the equilibrium that existed between AEM and REM prior to SOX. In response, they suggest that 
firms turned to more opaque and more defensible REM activities.3 In addition, Zang (2012) 
models the trade-off between REM and AEM more generally argues that heightened regulatory 
scruitiny at this time made AEM more costly. However, their analysis stops short of considering 
the implicit costs associated with relatively greater REM. Thus, in contrast to these studies that 
consider how SOX alters the relative costs of earnings management strategies, we focus on the 
                                                          
3 Survey responses in Graham et al. (2005) clearly indicate a preference for REM over AEM in the post-SOX era. 
Specifically, subjects express agreement (disagreement) with altering real activities (accrual estimates/assumptions) 
to hit an earnings target.  In subsequent interviews, CFOs reasoned that real earnings management is less susceptible 
to challenge. 
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economic implications of these activities before and after SOX. That is, rather than explain or 
control for the trade-off of REM and AEM, we examine the consequences of that trade-off. It 
stands to reason that managers choosing to ratchet up the level of REM after SOX would face 
even more difficult choices in order to have the same effect on short-term earnings. That is, 
managers must take more drastic measures that are more costly to long-run value relative to pre-
SOX. Thus, we contend that the shift in earnings management strategies in response to this 
exogenous shock is not innocuous.  
The objective of our study is to investigate how the substitution of REM for AEM after 
the passage of SOX affects the typical firm. We begin by directly examining the relation between 
REM and future firm performance pre- and post-SOX. If the increase in REM reflects an 
increase in opportunistic behavior with managers being confronted with more difficult and 
costlier choices, we expect post-SOX REM to be associated with lower levels of future 
profitability relative to pre-SOX REM. Likewise, if investors perceive that the increase in REM 
reflects a greater willingness by managers to sacrifice long-term value, we should observe a 
corresponding decrease in the value relevance of that activity. Of course, investors may have 
difficulty discerning opportunistic REM from normal business operations, in which case prices 
might not reflect an increase in myopic behavior.  
Additionally, we examine whether the post-SOX decrease in discretionary accrual 
activity is consistent with less AEM by examining how those accruals map to future 
performance. If in fact discretionary accruals are less tainted by managerial manipulation, then 
the relative quality of discretionary accruals should improve. Thus, the relation between 
discretionary accruals and future performance should increase after SOX. If investors recognize 
the increase in accrual quality, the value relevance of those accruals should increase as well. This 
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implies a stronger market reaction to discretionary accruals post-SOX. However, evidence in 
prior studies suggesting that investors tend to overestimate the earnings persistence of accruals 
(Sloan 1996; Xie 2001) complicates how the actual relation with returns might change. If less 
accrual manipulation coupled with greater reporting transparency following SOX contribute to 
more efficient pricing of discretionary accruals, market prices might be less prone to an initial 
overreaction. 
To test our predictions, we split our sample period into pre- and post-SOX regimes. We 
define the pre-SOX period as 1990-2001 and the post-SOX period as 2003-2012. We select a 
broad cross-section of firms to capture the on-average effects of AEM and REM across a range 
of incentives for earnings management. While earnings management may be more evident for a 
contextual subset of firms with a particular incentive to manage earnings (e.g., avoiding debt 
covenant violation, meeting analyst expectations or boosting compensation), we suspect that the 
specific conditions giving rise to that incentive will strongly influence the relations with future 
performance.4, 5  
To capture real earnings management activities, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and 
estimate abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses, and production 
costs. We estimate discretionary accruals following McNichols (2002) and assess future 
operating performance using return on assets (ROA) over the subsequent three years. As 
expected, we find that real earnings management activities in the post-SOX period are associated 
with lower levels of future ROA than in the pre-SOX period. This suggests an increase in 
                                                          
4 For example, earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations likely benefits shareholders and leads to 
higher future earnings than if the firm did not manage earnings. The same cannot be said of managers inflating 
current earnings to boost their compensation. 
5 We acknowledge that in a broader sample, our earnings management proxies might be capturing other effects. In 
supplemental analysis, we also discuss results for a set of “suspect” firms that avoid an earnings decline by a small 
amount. Results for this subset of firms also support our hypotheses, although relations with stock returns are 
sensitive to the return measure. 
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myopic behavior, i.e., operating decisions that boost short-term earnings but adversely impact 
future performance. We also find results consistent with our predictions about discretionary 
accruals. Specifically, we find that the relation between discretionary accruals and future firm 
performance is more positive post-SOX. This suggests a reduction in accrual manipulation and 
an increase in the relative quality of accruals.  
Consistent with our evidence that real earnings management after SOX leads to relatively 
lower levels of future ROA, we also find that it corresponds to relatively lower stock returns. 
This market-based test supports the view that the shift toward real earnings management reduces 
firm value. Further, the weaker contemporaneous return relation suggests that investors 
recognize to some extent the increase in opportunistic real earnings management activities. With 
respect to discretionary accruals, we find that their ability to predict future earnings improves 
after SOX, consistent with greater accrual quality. In addition, our return analysis points to less 
accrual mispricing (i.e., less overreaction) in the post-SOX period. We find that the 
contemporaneous market response to discretionary accruals decreases after SOX and future price 
reversals essentially disappear. The return results are consistent with both less accrual 
manipulation by managers (Cohen et al 2008) and greater awareness of opportunistic accruals by 
investors (Gavious and Rosenboim 2013). Our evidence that the relation between discretionary 
accruals and future ROA strengthens after SOX clearly supports the former explanation, but it is 
also plausible that investors take a more skeptical view of discretionary accruals in the post-SOX 
period and discount them accordingly.  
Finally, we consider the net effect of the shift in earnings management tactics. If real 
earnings management imposes greater economic costs on a firm than accrual manipulation, then 
the negative effects of increased real earnings management activities could more than offset any 
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economic benefits associated with less accrual management. To better illustrate the economic 
significance of these effects, we independently assign observations to quintiles based on real and 
accrual earnings management and compare firm performance in the pre- and post-SOX periods. 
Prior to SOX, moving from the bottom to the top quintile of real earnings management results in 
a 1 percent reduction in future ROA, but after SOX that grows to a 19.9 percent reduction in 
future ROA. Meanwhile, moving from the bottom to the top quintile of discretionary accruals 
results in a 7 percent decrease in future ROA before SOX but a 6.1 percent increase after SOX.  
Comparing the changes from pre- to post-SOX periods, the 18.9 percent decrease in future 
performance related to real earnings management activities more than offsets the 13.1 percent 
improvement related to discretionary accruals, suggesting a net negative impact on future 
profitability. Likewise, the negative stock price effect associated with the increase in real 
earnings management after SOX significantly outweighs the beneficial effect of higher quality 
discretionary accruals. Finally, we examine the joint effects of real and accrual earnings 
management and find that in the post-SOX period a combination of the two strategies is 
associated with both lower future profits and stock returns relative to the pre-SOX period. These 
results suggest that the shift in earnings management strategies that accompanied SOX had an 
overall detrimental effect on firm future performance and firm value. 
This study makes several contributions to existing research. First, the study extends real 
earnings management research by showing that the post-SOX increase in real activities 
manipulation documented by Cohen et al. (2008) is consistent with managers making more 
drastic choices to trade-off long-term value for short-term earnings. Further, it appears that 
investors partially recognize and price this myopic behavior after SOX. Second, we add to 
extensive literature examining the quality and pricing of accruals by showing that the post-SOX 
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decrease in discretionary accruals results in higher quality accruals (i.e., a stronger relation to 
future ROA). Similar to Green et al. (2015), our results suggest that the subsequent return 
reversal typically associated with discretionary accruals largely disappears after SOX. However, 
unlike their study, our results suggest that investors put less weight on discretionary accruals in 
the current period. Most importantly, our study brings these separate analyses together to extend 
research investigating the impact of SOX. We find that the resulting shift in earnings 
management strategies corresponds to a net negative effect in terms of future accounting 
performance and firm value, consistent with greater economic costs of real earnings management 
relative to accrual management. This points to potential unintended consequences of SOX that 
run counter to the overriding objective of enhanced financial reporting quality. 
The next section of the paper discusses background literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our earnings management proxies and sample, and Section 4 
presents the results of our analysis. The paper concludes with Section 5. 
 
2 Background and hypotheses 
2.1 Real earnings management literature 
In a well-recognized survey of corporate CFOs, Graham et al. (2005) report that a clear 
majority of executives would alter real activities, including delaying discretionary expenditures 
or positive NPV projects, in order to meet an earnings target.6 Alternatively, executives 
expressed a reluctance to modify accounting assumptions, even if those actions are within 
GAAP. Graham et al. explore this issue in follow-up interviews with respondents who note that 
unlike accounting policies, auditors have little basis for challenging real business decisions that 
                                                          
6 Of the CFOs surveyed, 80% (55%) agree or strongly agree with reducing discretionary spending on advertising, 
R&D or maintenance (delaying a new project that entails a small sacrifice in value). 
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are objectively measured and recorded. However, CFOs fear that even legitimate accounting 
choices could be questioned by aggressive regulators in the current (post-SOX) environment.  
Perhaps more intriguing is managers’ willingness to deviate from a value-maximizing path to 
deliver short-term earnings. Graham et al. conclude that most executives believe they are making 
an appropriate choice when sacrificing long-term economic value to avoid the immediate stock 
price turmoil associated with disappointing investors or creating uncertainty.  
A number of archival studies examining various operating, investing and financing 
decisions find results consistent with real activities manipulation.  These include curtailing 
discretionary expenditures such as research and development (R&D) or advertising (Baber, 
Fairfield and Haggar 1991, Dechow and Sloan 1991, Bushee 1998), building up inventory to 
diffuse fixed production costs (Jiambalvo, Noreen and Shevlin 1997, Thomas and Zhang 2002), 
offering favorable terms to accelerate sales (Oyer 1998), and timing asset sales to accelerate gain 
recognition (Bartov 1993).  Roychowdhury (2006) develops empirical proxies for the first three 
mechanisms and finds that they are strongly correlated with firms avoiding a loss. He also 
provides limited evidence that firms use these tactics to meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
expectations, consistent with managers attempting to convince stakeholders that earnings targets 
have been met in the normal course of business.7  
While the prior literature focuses on opportunistic incentives associated with REM 
activities, Gunny (2010) investigates the relation with future earnings. Specifically, she examines 
future ROA for firms using REM to avoid an earnings decline or a loss. Her evidence, based on a 
pre-SOX sample, suggests that firms using REM to just meet the target outperform those that 
                                                          
7 Other evidence of opportunistic real earnings management includes Cohen, Mashruwala and Zach (2010), who 
find that firms reduce advertising to avoid quarterly earnings losses and earnings decreases. Alissa, Bonsall, 
Koharki, and Penn (2013) find that firms use income-increasing (-decreasing) real earnings management when they 
are below (above) their expected credit rating. Finally, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest that firms use real 
earnings management prior to seasoned equity offerings, which contributes to post-SEO underperformance. 
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miss as well as those that meet the target without REM. She concludes that, the short-term 
benefits from managing real activities either signal or contribute to future firm performance. 
While Gunny’s (2010) findings based on relative firm performance provide context for 
managers’ decisions to alter operating decisions, they are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
survey results of Graham et al. (2005) that REM sacrifices some degree of long-run value. 
 
2.2 Discretionary accruals literature 
A separate stream of literature examines how managers affect reported earnings through 
accruals. While accruals serve to compensate for timing and matching issues associated with 
cash flows (Wilson 1986; Bowen et al. 1987; Dechow 1994), managers exercise considerable 
judgment over their recognition and measurement. However, unlike REM, any accrual-based 
earnings management simply shifts accounting recognition between periods and should not 
directly affect a firm’s fundamental economic value.8 Thus, AEM could be an effective short-run 
tool for managers to either inform or misinform stakeholders about firm prospects.   
Subramanyam (1996) decomposes total accruals into nondiscretionary and discretionary 
components and examines the market pricing of discretionary accruals. He concludes that 
managers use subjective judgment and estimation to signal or convey private information to 
investors about anticipated cash flows.9 Alternatively, numerous studies suggest that managers 
use discretionary accruals to mislead stakeholders for private benefit. For example, Healy 
(1985), Efendi et al. (2007), McAnally et al. (2008), Burns and Kedia (2006), and Bergstresser 
                                                          
8 Although accrual manipulation does not directly alter the underlying cash flows, the revelation of accrual 
manipulation can erode investor confidence in the financial reporting process or prompt regulatory penalties or 
litigation that impose real costs on a firm. Additionally, accrual management can indirectly affect cash flows and 
decrease firm value by facilitating wealth transfers, e.g., inflating employee compensation. 
9 Other studies supporting the signaling view of discretionary accruals include Louis and Robinson (2005), Tucker 
and Zarowin (2006) and Linck, Netter and Shu (2013). 
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and Philippon (2006) conclude that opportunistic managers use accrual earnings management to 
boost their compensation.10 Rather than communicating information to investors, these 
opportunistic accruals likely distort or garble the information in earnings.11 To the extent that 
investors are misled by opportunistic accruals, stock prices could deviate from fundamental 
values in predictable directions. In particular, Sloan (1996) suggests that investors overestimate 
the implications of accruals for future earnings and prices subsequently correct as future earnings 
are realized.  Xie (2001) shows that this anomaly is driven by the more discretionary portion of 
accruals. Thus, in contrast to the signaling view discussed above, the “accrual anomaly” research 
suggests that the market overreacts to discretionary accruals leading to short-run price distortions 
and future price reversals. Moreover, researchers often use the negative relation between 
discretionary accruals and future returns as an indication of AEM (e.g., Teoh, Welch and Wong 
1998; Louis 2004; and Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
 
2.3 Implications of SOX 
In the wake of several high-profile financial reporting scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to protect investors from 
the possibility of fraudulent accounting activities. The main objectives of SOX were to improve 
the corporate governance of US traded firms, increase the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures, and restore investors’ confidence in U.S. capital markets. Several recent studies 
suggest that SOX has been effective to some extent in achieving these objectives. For example, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that the mandated reporting of internal control deficiencies 
                                                          
10 Evidence that career concerns and penalties appear to moderate this behavior (Petroni 1992, Mergenthaler et al. 
2009, Ahmed et al. 2011, and Defond and Park 1997) further suggest that managers exercise discretion over accruals 
in their own self-interest. 
11 Jayaraman (2008) provides evidence that bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading increase when 
earnings are smoother than cash flows, consistent with accruals garbling publicly available information. 
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explains variation in cost of equity, and Bargeron et al. (2010) concludes that enhanced corporate 
governance associated with SOX discouraged risk taking by publicly traded U.S. firms. Further, 
Jain et al. (2008) find improvement in long-term market liquidity, and Brochet (2010) suggests 
that disclosures required by SOX reduced incentives for insiders to sell on private information.  
Focusing specifically on earnings management activities, Cohen et al. (2008) document 
that after the passage of SOX, AEM decreased but REM increased. They argue that greater 
scrutiny of accounting manipulations by auditors and regulators motivated opportunistic 
managers to turn to REM as a means of boosting earnings. In a comprehensive investigation of 
various costs affecting the earnings management choice, Zang (2012) also finds that SOX is 
associated with a decrease (increase) in AEM (REM).12 In contrast to these studies that consider 
how SOX alters the relative costs of earnings management strategies, we focus on the economic 
implications of these activities before and after SOX. That is, rather than explain or control for 
the trade-off of REM and AEM, we examine the consequences of that trade-off. 
Building on prior research, we argue that a greater reliance on real activities manipulation 
after SOX forces managers to take more drastic operational measures, relative to pre-SOX. For 
example, an opportunistic manager prior to SOX might cut back on marginal R&D projects and 
adjust certain accrual estimates to inflate current earnings. In the post-SOX environment, greater 
reluctance to manipulate accruals would likely necessitate cutting more promising R&D projects 
(or some other form of REM) to have the same effect on earnings. We essentially argue that the 
low-hanging fruit had already been picked. Thus, we posit an increasing marginal cost of real 
activities manipulation, whereby an additional dollar of REM implies a greater sacrifice of future 
                                                          
12 In a similar vein, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show analytically that tightening accounting standards (i.e., more 
rules-based) increases the cost of accrual manipulations and increases the marginal benefit of REM. Also, several 
studies suggest that monitoring by high quality auditors constrains the ability to manage accruals causing firms to 
resort to real earnings management techniques (Chi et al. 2011 and Burnett et al. 2012).   
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performance. Consistent with an overall increase in real activities manipulation after SOX, we 
predict that REM for the average firm will be less indicative of future earnings relative to pre-
SOX. This leads to our first hypothesis stated below in the alternative form. 
H1: The relation between real earnings management activities and future firm 
performance decreases after SOX. 
We note that any economic benefits associated with “delivering earnings” via greater REM 
(Gunny 2010) in the post-SOX period could offset the sacrifice of future performance and work 
against us finding support for our hypothesis. Likewise, if managers increase REM to signal 
future performance rather than for opportunistic reasons, the relation between REM and future 
firm performance could strengthen after SOX, resulting in a failure to reject H1.  
As an extension to H1, we also consider how market participants respond to this shift in 
earnings management strategies. Consistent with post-SOX REM conveying less information 
about future firm performance, it stands to reason that income arising from this activity would be 
less value relevant to investors. Thus, we expect that the relation between REM and stock returns 
also decreases after SOX. If greater levels of REM in the post-SOX environment imply that 
managers sacrifice even more long-term value for short-term benefit than in the pre-SOX 
environment, investors should discount this activity to a greater extent. However, even if we find 
support for H1, outsiders might have difficulty distinguishing opportunistic decisions from value 
maximizing decisions.13 Thus, our second hypothesis, which follows, represents a joint test of 
the economic implications and investor recognition of the behavior. 
H2: The relation between real earnings management activities and stock returns 
decreases after SOX. 
                                                          
13 In addition, real earnings management typically does not violate generally accepted accounting principles, so 
auditors have little reason to flag such activity. 
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If investors immediately recognize the trade-off of long-term value, we would expect to observe 
a change in the relation between real earnings management and contemporaneous returns. 
Alternatively, if investors recognize the value-decreasing effects when the firm eventually 
reports disappointing earnings, we would expect to observe a shift in the relation between real 
earnings management and future stock returns, consistent with a price correction. Although we 
do not formulate distinct hypotheses regarding contemporaneous and future returns, we examine 
the separate relations in our analysis. 
Cohen et al. (2008) also document that while discretionary accruals increase steadily 
from 1987 to 2001, they decrease after the passage of SOX. This trend is primarily driven by 
income increasing accruals.  Zhou (2008) also finds that both signed and unsigned discretionary 
accruals decrease post-SOX. Evidence of reduced discretionary accruals could be seen as 
fulfilling a major goal of SOX to restore investor confidence by focusing auditor attention on 
questionable accounting practices and making it more difficult and costly to manage earnings 
using accruals.  In a concurrent study, Green et al. (2015) examine the pricing of discretionary 
accruals over time and conclude that accrual mispricing decreases and value relevance increases 
after SOX. They interpret their results as evidence that overall accrual quality has improved; 
however, they do not directly link discretionary accruals to future accounting measures of 
performance.  Our study addresses that issue by considering how the relation between 
discretionary accruals and future performance changes after SOX.  
We assume that a given firm’s discretionary accruals include a mix of opportunistic 
accrual manipulations and informative estimates and judgments. A reduction in uninformative 
opportunistic accruals after SOX should lead to an increase in the relative proportion of 
informative discretionary accruals. Further, the opportunistic component constitutes accrual error 
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that must eventually reverse (Allen et al. 2013; Dechow et al. 2012). Therefore, a reduction in 
opportunistic manipulation implies less future earnings reversal per dollar of discretionary 
accruals.14 As we hypothesize below, the relation between discretionary accruals and future firm 
performance should be more positive post-SOX.  
H3: The relation between discretionary accruals and future firm performance 
increases after SOX. 
In addition to the relation between discretionary accruals and accounting performance, 
we also investigate the market’s pricing of discretionary accruals pre- and post-SOX. Following 
Green (2015), we expect that an increase in accrual quality should lead to a more positive 
relation to stock returns. However, other factors could serve to temper a stronger price reaction. 
First, if investors overreact to discretionary accruals prior to SOX, the per unit price response 
would be greater than warranted (Xie 2001).  If the proportion of low quality accruals declines 
after SOX, a previously excessive price response might now be more appropriate, resulting in 
little or no change.  Second, attention to scandals and the passage of SOX could alter investor 
perceptions of discretionary accruals irrespective of any change in accrual quality.  If SOX 
increased investor awareness of accrual manipulation (Gavious and Rosenboim 2013), it is 
plausible that the market views discretionary accruals with greater skepticism in the post-SOX 
period. Thus, investors might discount discretionary accruals to a greater extent even if overall 
quality improves. These factors, which are not mutually exclusive, work against finding support 
for our fourth hypothesis.    
                                                          
14 For example, a positive accrual reflecting earnings management will increase return on assets in period t; 
however, it will reverse in a future period with no corresponding cash flow, leading to a negative relation with future 
earnings. Alternatively, a positive accrual that signals future growth also increases return on assets in period t. 
However, it also correctly anticipates future benefits such that when the accrual reverses, it is replaced by a realized 
cash flow. 
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H4: The relation between discretionary accruals and stock returns increases after 
SOX. 
To provide additional insight on these issues, we examine how both contemporaneous and future 
return relations with discretionary accruals change after SOX. In particular, we expect that less 
accrual mispricing after SOX would manifest in less of a future price reversal.  
Finally, we examine the net effects of the shift away from AEM in favor of REM. 
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) we speculate that REM, which alters cash flows in a non-
value-maximizing way, is costlier than AEM, which simply shifts income recognition from one 
period to another. Thus, the predicted improvement in discretionary accrual quality, could be 
more than offset by managers’ willingness to sacrifice long-term value through greater REM. 
Alternatively, recent research suggests that firms use less earnings management after SOX to 
meet earnings benchmarks (Koh et al. 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009, Gilliam et al. 2014). In 
addition, Lobo and Zhou (2006, 2010) find that firms report more conservatively in the post-
SOX period. Thus, if the decline in AEM outpaces the increase in REM, the economic benefits 
of less accrual manipulation after SOX could exceed the incremental costs of greater real 
activities manipulation. Given the inherent uncertainty surrounding these events, we refrain from 
stating formal hypotheses and address this question as additional analysis. 
 
3 Variable measurement and sample 
3.1 Earnings management proxies 
 To test our hypotheses, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and identify deviations from the 
normal levels of cash flows from operations, discretionary expenditures, and production costs as 
REM proxies. Abnormal cash flows from operations arise from efforts to accelerate the timing of 
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sales and/or generate unsustainable sales through discounts and more lenient credit terms. These 
additional sales boost current period earnings; however, the additional sales fail to generate a 
commensurate level of cash flows. 15 Abnormal discretionary expenditures arise when research 
and development; selling, general, and administrative; and advertising spending levels deviate 
from what would be expected based on sales revenue. Reducing these expenses directly increases 
the current period’s earnings and likely increases current cash flows.16  Abnormal production 
costs arise when firms overproduce in order to report a lower cost of goods sold and higher net 
income. In this case, managers produce more units of inventory to spread the fixed overhead 
costs over a larger number of units, thereby lowering fixed costs per unit. If the decrease in fixed 
overhead costs per unit is larger than the increase in variable cost per unit from the increased 
production, the total cost per unit and cost of goods sold decline. In addition, product costs can 
be relatively high if firms offer sales discounts to stimulate revenue. Thus, abnormal production 
costs captures elements of REM for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. 
 We estimate the normal levels of the activities discussed above by year and industry 
using the Fama-French 48 industry classification codes. This allows the coefficients to vary 
across time while controlling for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that could affect 
operations. First, we estimate normal cash flows as a linear function of sales and change in sales 
using the following cross-sectional model: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                       (1) 
                                                          
15 This assumes that the sales discounts do not result in a negative profit margin. 
16 Current cash flows will increase to the extent that the foregone expenditure would have been paid in cash. This 
illustrates a limitation of the abnormal cash flow proxy in that other REM mechanisms could lead to positive rather 
than negative abnormal cash flows. 
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where CFOit is operating cash flow for firm i in year t, REVit is revenue, and Assetsi,t-1 is lagged 
total assets. Abnormal cash flows (A_CFOit) are measured as the residual from equation (1). 
Lower values of A_CFOit correspond to income increasing earnings management. 
 We similarly measure the normal level of discretionary expenses by industry and year as 
a linear function of sales as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                                               (2) 
where DISCXit represents the sum of discretionary expenses related to research and development, 
advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. Consistent with Roychowdhury 
(2006), we use the lagged value of sales revenue to avoid any potential mechanical problems if 
current sales are managed upward, which would result in significantly lower residuals when 
estimating equation (2). Residuals from equation (2) represent abnormal discretionary expenses 
(A_DISCXit) with lower values implying income increasing earnings management. 
 Finally, we define total production costs as cost of goods sold (COGSit) plus the change 
in inventory (∆INVit) during the year. We assume that the normal level of COGSit is a function of 
sales and that the normal ∆INVit is a function of current and lagged change in sales: 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                                        (3) 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                (4) 
Using equations (3) and (4), we estimate the normal level of production costs as the fitted value 
from the following model: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                (5)         
where PRODit is the sum of COGSit and ∆INVit. Abnormal production costs (A_PRODit) are 
defined as the residual from equation (5), with greater values of A_PRODit reflecting efforts to 
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increase net income. To facilitate interpretation of the real earnings management proxies, we 
multiply A_CFOit and A_DISCXit by negative one in our regression models so that greater values 
of these measures are also consistent with income increasing activity. 
  To proxy for AEM, we estimate discretionary accruals using the model from McNichols 
(2002), which combines the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models and controls 
for expected accrual reversals. Similar to the real earnings management proxies, we estimate the 
model annually by industry using the Fama-French 48 industry classification codes:17  
 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝛽4
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  
 𝛽5
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (6) 
where ∆WCit represents the change in working capital (i.e., change in accounts receivable, 
change in inventory, change in accounts payable, change in taxes payable, and change in other 
assets) and PPEit represents property plant and equipment. All other variables are defined above. 
The coefficients from equation (6) are used to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (NAit), and 
our measure of discretionary accruals (DAit) is the residual from equation (6). 
 
3.2 Sample description 
We draw our sample from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Research Files 
(COMPUSTAT) and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set for the period 
1990-2012. As discussed, our analysis focuses on earnings management in two distinct sub-
periods that we identify as pre-SOX and post-SOX. Since the SOX was passed in 2002, we 
define the pre-SOX period as 1990-1998 and the post-SOX period as 2003-2012. We explicitly 
omit 1998 through 2002 from the analysis to cleanly partition the data and to avoid overlapping 
                                                          
17 Results are qualitatively the same using the modified Jones (1991) model. 
19 
 
the samples since we use variables for up to three years ahead (i.e., t+3) in our return on asset 
and security return measures. We also restrict our sample to nonfinancial firms with available 
data and require at least eight observations in each of the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Our initial sample consists of 118,951 firm-year observations with sufficient data 
to estimate the real and accrual earnings management proxies. Data requirements to calculate 
control variables results in the loss of an additional 73,514 observations, resulting in 45,437 
observations (22,402 pre-SOX and 23,514 post-SOX) from 7,802 unique firms.  
 [Insert Table 1] 
 Panel A of table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Following prior research, 
we winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the influence of 
outliers.  For the main sample, the mean (median) of Assets (in millions) is 3,357.44 (208.78). 
The mean (median) value for the accrual earnings management proxy, DA, is 0.01 (0.02). The 
mean (median) levels of the REM proxies are 0.01, 0.00, and -0.03 (-0.01, 0.01, and -0.09) for 
A_CFO, A_PROD, and A_DISCX, respectively.18  
Panel B of table 1 presents the Pearson correlations of select variables. We note the 
positive relation between A_CFO and A_PROD, consistent with additional cash outflows from 
boosting income by overproducing. Likewise, the large positive correlation between A_CFO and 
A_DISCX likely reflects cash savings associated with increasing income by reducing discretionary 
expenditures.  The correlation between A_DISCX and DA is also significantly positive, consistent 
with reductions in discretionary expenses increasing discretionary accruals as well as cash flows. 
  
4 Empirical analysis 
                                                          
18 The REM and discretionary accrual proxies are residuals from OLS regressions.  Those models include all firms 
with available data for a given industry-year and not just our final sample firms. Accordingly, the means in Table 1 
do not necessarily equal zero. Also note that results in Table 1 are after we multiply A_CFO and A_DISCX by -1.   
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4.1 Real earnings management and future firm performance 
To test H1, which considers whether the relation between real activities manipulation and 
future firm performance decreases post-SOX, we estimate equation (7) using OLS. We measure 
future performance using ROA in the three-year period following year t.  
ROAi,t+j = α + β1REMit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + 
β7IND_ROAit + β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10REMit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + 
εit+1 (7) 
where ROAi,t+j is income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets and j = 1 to 3. REMit 
represents one of three real earnings management proxies: A_CFOit, A_PRODit, or A_DISCXit. 
To control for persistence in ROA, we include period t income, broken down into total accruals 
(TAit) and CFOit, both scaled by Assetsi,t-1.  TAit is as defined as earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations less CFOit .
 We also include sales growth (SGit), the natural 
log of total assets (SIZEit) and the market to book ratio (MTBit) to control for growth 
opportunities and size effects. We include the industry return on assets (IND_ROAit) using the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification codes to control for mean reversion of ROA and time 
series properties of firm performance. Finally, we include future compounded stock returns 
(RETit+j) to control for new value relevant information that is also captured in future ROA 
(Kothari and Sloan 1992). SOXit is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if an observation 
is post-SOX and zero otherwise, and REMit * SOXit is the interaction between the real earnings 
management proxy of interest and SOXit. We also interact SOXit with each control variable, 
except year and industry indicators; for brevity, we identify these interactions as Controlsit * 
SOXit in the model above. 
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The coefficient on REM (𝛽1) in equation (7) captures the incremental effects on future 
profitability in the pre-SOX period. Gunny (2010) finds a positive relation between REM and 
future ROA for firms meeting an earnings threshold and infers that in this situation managers 
alter real activities to signal future firm performance (or obtain current benefits that enhance 
future performance). Although we do not make explicit predictions about the sign of the 
coefficient in our multivariate model, H1 predicts an increase in opportunistic manipulation of 
real activities after the passage of SOX, which adversely impacts future performance. 
Accordingly, we expect the interaction between REM and SOX to be negatively associated with 
future ROA (i.e., β10 < 0) 
The results from estimating equation (7) are reported in Table 2, with each of the three 
REM proxies tabulated separately in Panels A, B, and C.  The first column in each panel reports 
results using the three-year aggregate ROA (ROAt+1, t+3) as the dependent variable, and the next 
three columns report the results for each year individually.19 We allow the number of 
observations for the individual year models to vary based on data availability, although we 
obtain comparable results when we use a constant sample. In Panel A, the coefficient on A_CFO 
is positive and significant, suggesting that in the pre-SOX period, firms use REM to signal or 
enhance future performance, consistent with Gunny (2010). However, in support of H1, the 
positive relation with future profitability weakens substantially after the passage of SOX. 
Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction between A_CFO and SOX is negative and 
significant for cumulative ROAt+1, t+3 (p < 0.01) and in each year t+1, t+2, and t+3 (p < 0.01). 
Thus, real earnings management activities post-SOX appear to reflect relatively more 
                                                          
19 Three-year aggregate ROA is calculated as the sum of net income before extraordinary items over the three years 
scaled by assets from the beginning of t+1.  
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opportunistic behavior (and relatively less signaling) than prior to SOX. The control variables 
exhibit expected relations with future ROA, although MTB is insignificant. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Panel B reports the results for the abnormal production cost proxy. The coefficient on 
A_PROD is positive and significant in each regression, but the coefficient on the interaction 
between A_PROD and SOX is significantly negative for cumulative ROAt+1, t+3 and in period t+1, 
only. Thus, we provide evidence that the relation between future return on assets and abnormal 
production costs decreases after SOX. In panel C, A_DISCX similarly exhibits a positive 
association with future ROA pre-SOX. As predicted, the coefficient on the interaction between 
A_DISCX and SOX is negative but only marginally significant for cumulative ROAt+1, t+3 and is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level for period t+1.   
In summary, we find fairly strong evidence in support of H1 with all three of the REM 
proxies. That is, as firms shift toward using more REM after SOX, they appear willing to 
sacrifice more future profits in the process. This is consistent with opportunistic managers 
interested in boosting income being confronted with more difficult choices resulting in more 
severe consequences for future performance. 
 
4.2 Real earnings management and returns 
Related to H2, we estimate the following model using OLS: 
RETi,t+j = α + β1REMit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7SOXit + 
β8REMit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + εit+1 (8) 
where RETi,t+j is defined as the 12-month abnormal return. To control for risk factors that 
could affect returns, we estimate abnormal returns based on the Fama-French three-factor model 
23 
 
(𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵)). We estimate model parameters over a 
one-year period ending six months prior to the start of the return accumulation period.20 All other 
variables are defined above. We test H2 using four-year returns, t though t+3, but we also 
estimate the model separately using contemporaneous returns, j=0, and future returns, j=1 to 3 to 
assess the timeliness of the market reaction.  
To the extent that investors interpret REM as a favorable incremental signal of future 
performance as suggested by results in Table 2, 𝛽1 in equation (8) should be positive. However, 
if after SOX firms engage in more opportunistic value-decreasing real activities manipulation, as 
hypothesized, the interaction between REM and SOX should be negatively related to stock 
returns. To the extent that the market promptly recognizes and partially discounts the increase in 
real activities manipulation, we would expect β8 to be negative and significant in the 
contemporaneous returns model. On the other hand, if the market reaction is largely captured in 
future returns, it could suggest that investors have difficulty recognizing the increase in real 
activities management. 
Results from estimating equation (8) are reported in Table 3 with each of the three 
proxies presented in a separate panel.21 The first column of each panel reflects the cumulative 
return model, RETt,t+3. In panel A, we find that A_CFOit is positively associated with RETt,t+3 
during the pre-SOX period, consistent with investors recognizing and pricing the incremental 
information in abnormal cash flows about future earnings. In support of H2, the coefficient on 
A_CFO*SOX is negative and significant (p < 0.01), indicating a weaker price reaction to REM in 
the post-SOX period. Panels B and C reveal similar findings with cumulative returns.  In panel B 
(panel C), the coefficient on A_PROD (A_DISCX) is positive and significant, while the 
                                                          
20 Results are qualitatively the same using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
21 Requiring return data reduces the sample size slightly compared to the ROA analysis. However, we obtain similar 
results if we estimate all models with a constant sample. 
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coefficient on the interaction A_PROD*SOX (A_DISCX*SOX) is negative and significant at the 
one percent level.  In short, the price relations mirror the weaker relation with future profitability 
documented in Table 2. Therefore, all three panels provide support for H2; investors view the 
increase in REM after SOX as implying greater sacrifice of long-run value.  
[Insert Table 3] 
We next estimate equation (8) using returns for year t, t+1, t+2 and t+3, separately, and 
report those results in the second through fifth columns of each panel.  In all three panels, we 
observe a positive relation between the REM proxy and contemporaneous returns (RETt) prior to 
SOX, but that relation significantly weakens after SOX. This suggests to us that investors 
recognize and price to some extent the changing implications of managing real activities in the 
current period. Interestingly, the same pattern is also evident with RETt+1, i.e, a significant 
reduction in the return relation after-SOX. In two of the three cases, the effect in year t+1 
appears stronger than that in year t. In addition, although the coefficient on the interaction term 
diminishes steadily after t+1 for A_CFO and A_DISCX, they continue to be negative and 
significant through t+3, implying some degree of delay in the market response. In addition, the 
interaction coefficient on A_PROD is not significant in period t and is largest in t+1, suggesting 
that the market has a more delayed response for abnormal production than for the other REM 
proxies. 
In summary, we find evidence suggesting that, the shift towards more management of 
real activities after the passage of SOX reflects greater managerial opportunism, and investors at 
least partially recognize and price this change in behavior. Whereas in the pre-SOX period, REM 
is associated with a positive price reaction in t and t+1, these relations attenuate considerably 
after SOX.  
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4.3 Accrual earnings management and future firm performance 
To test H3, we estimate the relation between discretionary working capital accruals and 
future ROA. We use the following model, which parallels equation (7): 
ROAi,t+j = α + β1DAit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7IND_ROAit 
+ β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10DAit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + εit+1 (9) 
where DAit, is discretionary accruals, estimated using equation (6), and TAit is total accruals. All 
other variables are as previously defined. If DAit provides incremental information about future 
profitability, we would expect to observe a positive relation with ROA over the subsequent three 
years. Additionally, consistent with a reduction in accrual manipulation post-SOX, and therefore 
fewer earnings reversals attributable to accrual errors, H3 predicts a positive coefficient on the 
interaction between DA and SOX (i.e., β10 > 0). 
The results from estimating equation (9) are reported in Table 4. We find a negative 
coefficient on DAit in the ROAt+1, t+3 model, as well as each of the individual year models, 
indicating that discretionary accruals do not provide incremental information about future 
earnings in the pre-SOX period. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction term, 
DA*SOX, is positive and significant in each of the future ROA models, which supports H3. This 
suggests that in the post-SOX period, the earnings effect of an accrual in period t is less likely to 
reverse in a subsequent period. Overall, our results support the view that AEM decreases after 
SOX, and the relative quality of accruals increases on average. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.4 Accrual earnings management and returns 
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We next examine whether the market’s perceptions of discretionary accruals change after 
SOX as hypothesized in H4. We estimate the following return model similar to equation (8): 
RETi,t+j = α + β1DAit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7SOXit + 
β8DAit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + ε   (10) 
Based on the discretionary accruals pricing literature (Subramanyam 1996), we expect the main 
effect of DA, reflecting the pre-SOX relation, to be positive. The coefficient on the interaction, 
DA*SOX, captures any change in the incremental pricing of DA after SOX. H4 predicts a 
positive value for β8, corresponding to greater accrual quality documented in Table 4. However, 
as discussed above, prior evidence of accrual mispricing coupled with heightened sensitivity to 
accrual manipulation post-SOX (Gavious and Rosenboim 2013) complicates this relation. 
We show the results from estimating equation (10) in Table 5. The first column reports 
results using RETt, t+3 as the dependent variable. Consistent with Subramanyam (1996), we find a 
positive association between discretionary accruals and long-term stock returns in the pre-SOX 
period. However, despite our evidence in Table 4 that accrual quality improves after SOX, we 
find that the incremental relation with long-term returns does not increase. That is, while we 
observe a positive coefficient on DA*SOX, it is not significant. In light of prior research 
concluding that investors initially overreact to discretionary accruals (Xie 2001), the market 
reaction after SOX is more consistent with higher quality accruals than greater investor 
skepticism of discretionary accruals and/or less mispricing.  In other words, the effect of better 
accrual quality possibly offsets the effect of more efficient accrual pricing post-SOX.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Our separate analysis of contemporaneous and future stock returns provides further 
evidence of a reduction in mispricing. The results for RETt are reported in column 2, and results 
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for RETt+1 through RETt+3 are reported in the last three columns.  The pre-SOX relation captured 
by β1, reveals a strong positive relation between DA and returns in year t but a strong negative 
relation with returns in t+1.  This fits with the accrual anomaly research concluding that 
investors initially overreact to discretionary accruals and prices subsequently correct. β8 reflects 
the change in the post-SOX period and indicates a much smaller initial market reaction and less 
of a subsequent price reversal.   The interaction term DA*SOX is negative and significantly 
associated with returns in year t (p < 0.01) and positive and significantly (marginally) associated 
with returns in t+1 (t+2). Further, the sum of β1 and β8 in the RETt+1 and RETt+2 models are 
insignificant, indicating that the price reversal essentially disappears after SOX.22 
In summary, we find evidence suggesting that firms engage in less accrual manipulation 
and that the market more efficiently prices discretionary accruals post-SOX. Improved accrual 
quality is supported by an increase in the relation between discretionary accruals and future ROA 
in the post-SOX period. The weaker contemporaneous market response (and disappearance of a 
return reversal) suggests that the reduction in accrual mispricing dominates the price implications 
of improved accrual quality. 
 
4.5 Net effects of earnings management after SOX 
Finally, to examine the net effects of the shift in earnings management tactics after SOX 
and to better illustrate the economic significance, we examine changes in performance 
(accounting and market) associated with portfolios of real and accrual earnings management. 
Specifically, in each sample year we independently rank firms based on real and accrual earnings 
                                                          
22 In t+1, -0.196 + 0.165 = -0.031 (t-statistic = -1.04), and in t+2, -0.018 + 0.011 = -0.007 (t-statistic = -0.66). 
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management and assign them to quintiles.23 We calculate the mean ROAt+1, t+3 for each quintile 
and quantify the economic effect of each earnings management strategy by subtracting quintile 1 
from quintile 5, designated by the superscripts Low and High, respectively.24, We do this 
separately for the pre-SOX period and the post-SOX period and compute the difference-in-
differences for each form of earnings management. By identifying top and bottom quintiles 
separately in the pre- and post-SOX periods, we capture changes in the distributions of REM and 
DA as a result of SOX and assess the implications of these changes for future earnings and stock 
returns. We anticipate greater inter-quintile variation in REM after SOX and correspondingly 
greater variation in firm performance. Consistent with our earlier results, we expect that the 
future ROA related to real activities management (REMH-L) will be more negative after SOX, 
while the future ROA related to accrual management (DAH-L) will be more positive after SOX.  
Comparing the decrease associated with REM and the increase associated with AEM provides 
insight into the net earnings management effect at this time.  
Table 6 includes the earnings management portfolio analysis of future ROA, with pre-
SOX data in Panel A and post-SOX data in Panel B. The first row (column) reflects the full 
sample conditional on the magnitude of accrual (real) earnings management. In the pre-SOX 
period, the difference in ROAt+1, t+3 between the top and bottom discretionary accrual quintiles, 
DAH-L, is -0.04 (p-value < 0.05). The difference for extreme real earnings management quintiles, 
REMH-L, is 0.01 (p-value > 0.10). This is consistent with AEM playing a much greater role and 
imposing greater long-run costs than REM prior to SOX.  However, in the post-SOX period 
DAH-L reverses to +0.03 (p-value < 0.05), while REMH-L grows to -0.09 (p-value < 0.01), 
                                                          
23 To split the sample into REM quintiles, we follow Cohen et al. (2008) and compute a comprehensive measure of 
REM by standardizing and summing the three separate proxies.   
24 The middle three quintiles are grouped together in the portfolio designated Med. Focusing on the differences in 
extreme quintiles assigned annually helps to alleviate any market-wide effects. 
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consistent with improved accrual quality but more severe real activities manipulation.  
Comparing the pre- and post-SOX differences, the greater negative impact of real earnings 
management (-0.10) exceeds the improvement from discretionary accruals (0.07), and the net 
difference (-0.03) is significant at the five percent level. 25 Thus, using the top and bottom 
quintiles to capture the range of each earnings management approach, we infer that the 
substitution of REM for AEM after SOX entailed a net negative effect on future earnings. 
[Insert Table 6] 
The other rows (columns) report accrual (real) earnings management portfolios, 
controlling for the level of real (accrual) earnings management. The same general trends are 
observed after controlling for the other earnings management strategy, i.e., DAH-L becomes 
positive after SOX and REMH-L becomes much more negative.  
Finally, we examine how a joint strategy of real and accrual earnings management 
changes after SOX. That is, we compare firms identified as high for both types of earnings 
management to those identified as low for both types of earnings management in both the pre- 
and post-SOX periods. Specifically, we subtract the top-left cell from the bottom-right cell in 
each panel, i.e., (DAHighREMHigh) - (DALowREMLow). In the pre-SOX period, the difference is -
0.01 [(-0.09) – (-0.08)], but after SOX the difference increases to -0.06 [(-0.11) – (-0.05)]. The 
post-SOX minus pre-SOX difference of -0.05 is significant at the five percent level, supporting 
the interpretation that a combined earnings management approach imposes greater economic 
costs after SOX.  
Table 7 reports a similar portfolio analysis focusing on the four-year compounded return, 
RETt, t+3, instead of future ROA to investigate the net pre- and post-SOX implications for firm 
value. Consistent with Table 6, we find that the negative firm value effects associated with REM 
                                                          
25 For real earnings management (-0.09) – (-0.01) = -0.10; for discretionary accruals (0.03) – (-0.04) = 0.07. 
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get much worse after SOX (-0.27). Alternatively, the firm value effects associated with DA 
improve from pre-SOX to post-SOX (0.04). While we do not find a significant association 
between DA and long-term stock returns after sox in Table 5, these results provide evidence of a 
stronger relation between DA and long-term stock returns.26 Importantly, the negative REM 
relation more than offsets the positive DA relation. The net of the two effects (-0.23) is 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the price implications of more opportunistic 
real earnings management dominate. 27 Further, more negative returns associated with real 
earnings management after SOX are observed regardless of the level of discretionary accruals. 
Alternatively, more positive returns from improvement in accrual quality are only observed for 
low levels of REM. This further illustrates the sensitivity of the discretionary accrual and stock 
return relation discussed above.   
[Insert Table 7] 
We next evaluate the joint price implications of real and accrual earnings management 
focusing on the top-left and bottom-right cells. Prior to SOX, we find that (DAHighREMHigh) - 
(DALowREMLow) is 0.15 [(0.03) – (-0.12)] over four years, but after SOX the difference decreases 
to -0.05 [(-0.08) – (-0.03)]. Thus, comparing firms that more likely engage in both earnings 
management strategies to those less likely indicates that a combination of the two approaches 
yields significantly smaller returns after SOX (one percent level). 
                                                          
26 The analysis in Table 5 uses OLS to estimate equation (10) for the full sample with a continuous measure of DA. 
The analysis in Table 7 focuses on mean returns for extreme DA firms and does not assume linearity. In addition, 
equation (10) controls for earnings and other firm characteristics; Table 7 does not. To help reconcile these results, 
we re-estimate equation (10) using a binary measure of DA and only those observations in the extreme quintiles. We 
code DA=0 for the bottom quintile, DA=1 for the top quintile, and drop the middle quintiles. We find that the 
coefficient on the interaction term DA*SOX is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05) in this model. Further, if we 
define DA as an ordinal variable corresponding to the quintile assignments for the full sample, the interaction term is 
positive but insignificant. Thus, we conclude that contrasting results in Tables 5 and 7 are attributable to research 
design differences, including sample composition and variable definition, rather than a failure to control for 
correlated factors. 
27 For real earnings management (-0.18) – (0.09) = -0.27; for discretionary accruals (0.16) – (0.12) = 0.04. 
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Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 confirm our earlier findings and highlight the 
economic significance by quantifying the range in accounting and market performance between 
the top to bottom quintiles of earnings management, we show that the net effect of the two 
earnings management relations do not completely offset. In particular, the negative implications 
of greater real earnings management in the post-SOX period outweigh the benefits of 
discretionary accrual improvement in terms of future profitability or firm value. 
 
4.6 Additional analyses 
Our sample intentionally includes a broad cross-section of firms rather than a more 
contextual sample of suspect firms in an effort to abstract away from the particular economic 
conditions that could incentivize firms to engage in earnings management. While this allows us 
to capture the on-average implications of alternative earnings management strategies, it is 
possible that REM and DA capture other effects besides earnings management. Despite our 
efforts to control for these effects in our model, those controls might be incomplete. 
Accordingly, we also examine a subset of firms that ex post more likely manage earnings. We 
identify 2,038 firm-year observations (1,250 pre-SOX and 933 post-SOX) with available data 
that avoid an earnings decline by less than 0.01 (earnings scaled by total assets) and repeat the 
return on assets and security return analysis. We tabulate the summary ROAt+1,t+3 regressions for 
each earnings management proxy.  
[Insert Table 8] 
In the first column of Panel A in Table 8, consistent with Table 4 and H3, we find a 
negative and significant coefficient on DA and a positive and significant coefficient on 
DA*SOX. Additionally, in columns 2-4, the REM proxies, A_CFO, A_PROD, and A_DISCX, 
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are all positive and significantly associated with ROAt+1,t+3 in the pre-SOX period; however, all 
three of the interactions between the REM proxies and SOX are negative and significant at the 
one percent level, which is consistent with our earlier findings and prediction for H4. 
In Panel B, we tabulate the three-year return on assets for suspect firms in the pre-SOX 
and post-SOX periods. The average ROA is negative for suspect firms pre- and post-SOX. 
Additionally, consistent with our findings in Table 6, we find that the difference in ROA from 
pre- to post-SOX (-0.05) is significant at the one percent level, suggesting that even though 
suspect firms are less likely (more likely) to use AEM (REM) post-SOX, they have lower future 
return on assets post-SOX. 
We also tabulate summary our regression results for security returns, RETt,t+3, and 
suspect firms. In the first column of Panel A in Table 9, DA is positive and significant, consistent 
with our earlier findings; however, DA*SOX is also negative and significant, whereas DA*SOX 
was positive and insignificant in Table 5. This provides strong evidence that the market is pricing 
accruals more appropriately post-SOX for this subset of firms. Additionally, in columns 2-4, we 
find results consistent with Panels A, B, and C of Table 2, suggesting that firms engage in more 
opportunistic value-decreasing real activities manipulation post-SOX. 
[Insert Table 9] 
In Panel B, we tabulate four year returns for suspect firms in the pre- and post-SOX 
periods. The average return is positive and significant in the pre-SOX period and negative and 
significant in the post-SOX period. Additionally, the difference (Post-Pre) is negative and 
significant, consistent with the results from Table 7. This suggests that, although firms use less 
(more) AEM (REM) post-SOX, returns are significantly lower. 
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Although we cumulate stock returns over several years, they reflect a “change” in firm 
value and are aimed at the market value of common equity as opposed to the current market 
value of the firm. As an alternative, we also use Tobin’s q (Brainard and Tobin 1968), which 
captures the level of firm value. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity 
plus long-term debt to the book value of equity plus long-term debt.  
[Insert Table 10] 
In Table 10, DA is negative and marginally significant in the pre-SOX period, while two 
of the three REM proxies are positive and significant.28 Meanwhile, DA*SOX remains positive 
and significant, suggesting higher accrual quality and less mispricing post-SOX, which is 
consistent with prior results.  Additionally, also consistent with prior results, the interactions 
between two of the three REM proxies (A_CFO and A_PROD) and SOX are negative and 
significant suggesting more opportunistic earnings management behavior post-SOX.29 
 Finally, we examine the relation between earnings management activities of suspect firms 
pre- and post-SOX and the Altman (1968) ZSCORE. The ZSCORE is a formula that is used to 
predict the likelihood that a company could go into bankruptcy. Thus, we predict that firms 
suspected of engaging in earnings management activities post-SOX will have lower ZSCORES 
than firms suspected of earnings management in the pre-SOX.  
[Insert Table 11] 
 For AEM, we find that DA is negatively associated with ZSCORE in the pre-SOX 
period, and the interaction on DA*SOX is positive and significant suggesting that firms 
suspected of AEM have a higher probability of bankruptcy during the pre-SOX period. We also 
find that all three REM proxies are positive and significant while the interactions on the REM 
                                                          
28 DISCX is in the predicted direction but is not significant. 
29 DISCX*SOX is in the predicted directions but is only marginally significant. 
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proxies and SOX are negative and significant, consistent with firms suspected of REM activities 
having a higher probability of bankruptcy during the post-SOX period. In untabulated analysis, 
we also find that firms suspected of EM in the post-SOX period have lower ZSCORES than they 
did in the pre-SOX period, as defined previously. These firms also exhibit lower ZSCORES 
when compared to the prior year. These findings are consistent with the negative implications of 
greater real earnings management in the post-SOX period outweighing the benefits of 
discretionary accrual improvement. 
 
5 Conclusion 
While prior research suggests that firms shifted away from accrual manipulation in favor 
of REM after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Cohen et. al 2008), the economic 
effects of this switch for the typical firm remain unclear. This study examines how the relations 
between earnings management (real and accrual) and measures firm performance change with 
the advent of SOX. Our analysis supports the view that the increase in real activities 
management post-SOX is driven by opportunistic managers willing to forego greater levels of 
future profits. Specifically, we find that the positive relation between several REM proxies and 
future ROA weakens after SOX. This implies that managers find it necessary to sacrifice more 
long-term value when engaging in real activities manipulation. It also appears that investors 
recognize and price to some extent this change in behavior, suggesting that these trade-offs are 
more detrimental to firm value. In addition, our analysis of discretionary accruals pre- and post-
SOX reveals that their association with future ROA increases, consistent with improved accrual 
quality. Alternatively, the relation between discretionary accruals and stock returns suggests less 
mispricing after SOX, which is also consistent with better financial reporting transparency. 
Perhaps the most interesting part of our study is the investigation of the net economic 
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implications. With respect to both future profitability and stock prices, we find that the adverse 
effects of REM after SOX outweigh the benefits of less AEM. This is also borne out by an 
examination of the joint effects of real and accrual earnings management, focusing on those 
firms that are high and low in both strategies. The combination results in greater economic costs 
in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. 
We recognize that the study has some limitations. First, we cannot unequivocally 
attribute the above economic consequences to SOX, as several other concurrent developments 
could have contributed to the results. Therefore, our identification of pre- and post-SOX periods 
refers to the changing financial reporting climate at this time rather than specific features of the 
legislation. Additionally, there are inherent limitations in measuring earnings management. One 
limitation is that discretionary accrual models lack power and are often mispecified (Dechow et 
al. 2012). Third, while it is likely that managers can alter a number of different real activities to 
affect earnings, this study focuses on only three activities.  
 Despite the limitations noted above, the findings of this study provide unique insights 
concerning the fundamental objectives of SOX to curb earnings management and restore investor 
confidence. Even though accrual management decreased following SOX, the negative 
implications associated with the increase in real activities management post-SOX had a net 
negative effect on future performance and firm value. Thus, in the context of prior research 
identifying the numerous benefits of SOX, our results are consistent with potential unintended 
consequences that should be of particular interest to both investors and regulators.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
∆INV Change in inventory (annual Compustat data item 3) 
∆WC The change in accounts receivable (annual Compustat data item 302) plus 
the change in inventory (annual Compustat data item 303) minus the 
change in accounts payable (annual Compustat data item 304) minus the 
change in taxes payable (annual Compustat data item 305) plus the change 
in other assets (annual Compustat data item 307). 
A_CFO Actual CFO minus normal CFO, where CFO is operating cash flows and 
normal CFO is the fitted value from equation (1). 
A_DISCX Actual discretionary expenses minus normal discretionary expenses, where 
discretionary expenses are the sum of research and development, 
advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenses and normal 
discretionary expenses is the fitted value from equation (2).  
A_PROD Actual production costs minus normal production costs, where productions 
costs are the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventory and 
normal production costs is the fitted value from equation (6). 
ASSETS Total assets (annual Compustat data item 6). 
CFO Operating cash flows (annual Compustat data item 308 – annual Compustat 
data item 124) scaled by beginning ASSETS. 
COGS Cost of goods sold (annual Compustat data item 41). 
RET Fama-French three-factor cumulative abnormal returns. 
DA ∆WC minus NA scaled by beginning ASSETS. 
DISCX Sum of advertising expenses (annual Compustat data item 45), R&D 
expenses (annual Compustat data item 46), and SG&A (annual Compustat 
data item 189).  
IND_ROA Industry mean ROA using the Fama-French 48 industry classification 
codes. 
MTB Market capitalization divided by book value of common equity (annual 
Compustat data item 60), where market capitalization is the price per share 
(annual Compustat data item 199) times the number of shares (annual 
Compustat data item 25) 
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NA Nondiscretionary accruals; the fitted value from equation (6). 
PPE Gross value of property, plant, and equipment (annual Compustat data item 
7). 
PROD Sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventory. 
REM A_CFO, A_PROD, or A_DISCX. 
REV Revenue (annual Compustat data item 12)  
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (annual 
Compustat data item 123) /ASSETS. 
SG Change in sales scaled by beginning ASSETS.  
SIZE Natural logarithm of ASSETS. 
SOX Indicator variable equal to 1 for post-SOX observations (1990-1998); 0 for 
pre-SOX observations (2003-2012). 
TA EXBI – CFO, where EXBI is the earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (annual Compustat data item 123) and CFO is the 
operating cash flows (annual Compustat data item 308 – annual Compustat 
data item 124) scaled by beginning ASSETS. 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + long-term debt)/(book value of equity + long-
term debt) 
ZSCORE Altman’s (1968) Z-score. 
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Table 1  
Sample Characteristics 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics for Select Variables     
 MEAN MEDIAN Q1 Q3 
ASSETS 
 
DA 
3457.44 
 
0.01 
208.78 
 
0.02 
48.02 
 
-0.03 
1078.00 
 
0.08 
     
A_CFO 
 
A_PROD 
 
A_DISCX 
 
NA 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.08 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.07 
-0.07 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.11 
0.18 
 
0.18 
 
0.04 
 
-0.04 
     
CFO 
 
PROD 
 
DISCX 
 
MTB 
0.04 
 
0.74 
 
0.36 
 
3.31 
0.08 
 
0.60 
 
0.28 
 
1.99 
-0.01 
 
0.29 
 
0.12 
 
1.19 
0.14 
 
1.02 
 
0.49 
 
3.47 
 
SIZE 
 
SG 
 
RETt,t+3 
 
 
5.51 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
5.34 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
3.87 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.03 
 
6.98 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
ROAt+1,t+3 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.21 
     
TA -0.07 -0.05 
 
-0.10 -0.01 
N        45,437    
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Panel B – Select Pearson Correlations 
 DA A_CFO A_PROD A_DISCX 
 
TA NA PROD    CFO DISCX 
DA 1         
A_CFO 0.05 1        
A_PROD 0.01 0.05 1       
A_DISCX 0.16 0.28 0.02 1      
TA 0.94 -0.00 -0.01 - 0.15 1     
NA -0.10 0.16 0.01 - 0.20 0.21 1    
PROD -0.01 -0.01 0.70 0.02 0.00 0.02 1   
CFO 0.05 0.62 0.00 -0.37 0.00 0.27 0.00 1  
DISCX -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.74 -0.19 -0.23 0.02 -0.63 1 
RETt,t+3 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.07 
ROAt+1,t+3 0.03 0.19 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.56 0.50 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics, and panel B presents a Pearson correlation matrix for our sample of 45,437 
firm-year observations for the period 1990 – 2012, omitting 2002. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. In panel B, numbers reported in bold indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level. See 
Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 2 
Real Earnings Management Activities and Future Firm Performance 
 
Panel A – Abnormal Cash Flows 
 
ROAi,t+j = α + β1A_CFOit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7IND_ROAit + 
β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10A_CFOit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + ε                                          (7) 
 
Dependent 
Variable   
      ROAt+1,t+3      ROAt+1      ROAt+2     ROAt+3 
A_CFO 0.067** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.026* 
TA 0.918*** 0.015*** 0.281*** 0.255*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
2.131*** 
0.031*** 
0.609*** 
0.030*** 
-0.002** 
-0.271* 
-0.005 
-0.074*** 
-0.275*** 
0.817*** 
0.007*** 
0.170*** 
0.032*** 
-0.0001 
-0.168* 
-0.016*** 
-0.027*** 
-0.048*** 
0.707*** 
0.018*** 
0.184*** 
0.005** 
-0.0001* 
-0.080 
-0.009*** 
-0.032*** 
-0.036*** 
0.578*** 
0.012*** 
0.252*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.000 
-0.077 
0.022*** 
-0.034*** 
-0.121*** 
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Panel B – Abnormal Production Costs 
 
ROAi,t+j = α + β1A_PRODit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7IND_ROAit + 
β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10A_PRODit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + ε                                        (7) 
 
Dependent 
Variable   
      ROAt+1,t+3      ROAt+1      ROAt+2     ROAt+3 
A_PROD 0.140*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.032** 
TA 0.916*** 0.375*** 0.280*** 0.255*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
2.107*** 
0.033*** 
0.623*** 
0.026*** 
-0.003** 
-0.291* 
0.007 
-0.070** 
-0.297*** 
0.804*** 
0.008*** 
0.180*** 
0.032*** 
-0.000 
-0.174** 
-0.026*** 
-0.019** 
-0.055*** 
0.686*** 
0.012*** 
0.202*** 
0.005** 
-0.001* 
-0.089 
-0.003 
-0.023* 
-0.036*** 
0.581*** 
0.012*** 
0.244*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.000 
-0.082 
0.025*** 
-0.019 
-0.126*** 
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Panel C – Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
ROAi,t+j = α + β1A_DISCXit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7IND_ROAit 
+ β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10A_DISCXit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + ε                                   (7) 
 
Dependent Variable         ROAt+1,t+3      ROAt+1      ROAt+2     ROAt+3 
A_DISCX 0.039** 0.189*** -0.010* -0.017** 
TA 0.943*** 0.383*** 0.289*** 0.268*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
2.132*** 
0.033*** 
0.567*** 
0.028*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.283* 
0.006 
-0.022* 
-0.292*** 
0.812*** 
0.008*** 
0.180*** 
0.032*** 
-0.000 
-0.170** 
-0.027*** 
-0.016** 
-0.053*** 
0.695*** 
0.012*** 
0.183*** 
0.006** 
-0.001** 
-0.086 
-0.003 
-0.003 
-0.092*** 
0.593*** 
0.013*** 
0.215*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.001 
-0.084 
0.025*** 
-0.007 
-0.127*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results of estimating equation (7) with return on assets as the 
dependent variable and A_CFO, A_DISCX, and A_PROD as the respective variables of interest. The columns 
ROAt+1,t+3, ROAt+1, ROAt+2, and ROAt+3 represent the ROA for periods t+1through t+3, t+1, t+2, and t+3, 
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 3  
Market Pricing of Real Earnings Management Activities 
 
Panel A – Abnormal Cash Flows 
 
RETi,t+j = α + β1A_CFOit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7SOXit + 
β8A_CFOit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + εit                                                                              (8) 
 
Dependent 
Variable   
          RETt,t+3 RETt      RETt+1      RETt+2 RETt+3 
A_CFO 0.188*** 0.211*** 0.205*** -0.121*** -0.043* 
CFO 2.147*** 0.897*** 0.201*** 0.124*** 0.136*** 
TA 0.515*** 0.297*** 0.057** 0.097** 0.047 
SIZE 
SG 
MTB 
SOX 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.032*** 
0.391 
0.001 
0.047 
-0.256*** 
-0.724*** 
-0.022*** 
0.938*** 
0.017*** 
0.315*** 
-0.181*** 
-0.056*** 
-0.016*** 
-0.325** 
-0.009*** 
-0.316*** 
-0.164*** 
-0.542*** 
-0.011*** 
-0.231 
-0.004*** 
0.191*** 
-0.060** 
-0.054*** 
-0.003** 
-0.003 
-0.002*** 
-0.077*** 
-0.053** 
0.150*** 
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Panel B – Abnormal Production Costs 
RETi,t+j = α + β1A_CFOit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7SOXit + 
β8A_CFOit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + εit                                                                              (8) 
 
Dependent 
Variable   
          RETt,t+3 RETt      RETt+1      RETt+2 RETt+3 
A_PROD 0.106* 0.038** 0.103** -0.121*** -0.043* 
CFO 1.035*** 0.295*** 0.205*** 0.124*** 0.189*** 
TA 0.526*** 0.251*** 0.240*** 0.097** 0.132** 
SIZE 
SG 
MTB 
SOX 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.041*** 
0.395 
0.002*** 
0.072*** 
-0.222*** 
0.733*** 
-0.020*** 
0.918*** 
0.018*** 
0.314*** 
-0.015 
-0.072*** 
-0.011*** 
-0.356* 
-0.004*** 
-0.274*** 
-0.038* 
0.480*** 
-0.011*** 
-0.206 
-0.004*** 
0.167*** 
-0.212*** 
-0.003 
-0.003** 
0.035 
-0.002*** 
-0.088*** 
-0.123*** 
0.204*** 
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Panel C – Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
 
RETi,t+j = α + β1A_DISCXit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7SOXit + 
β8A_DISCXit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + εit                                                                         (8) 
Dependent 
Variable   
          RETt,t+3 RETt      RETt+1      RETt+2 RETt+3 
A_DISCX 0.160*** 0.032** -0.136*** -0.039** -0.004 
CFO 1.655*** 0.304*** 0.234*** 0.098*** 0.139*** 
TA 0.488*** 0.263*** 0.057** 0.065** 0.085*** 
SIZE 
SG 
MTB 
SOX 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.038*** 
0.386 
0.002** 
0.055** 
-0.163*** 
-0.728*** 
-0.022*** 
0.938*** 
0.017*** 
0.317*** 
-0.032*** 
-0.060*** 
-0.014*** 
-0.322* 
-0.009*** 
-0.280*** 
-0.156*** 
0.502*** 
-0.007*** 
-0.232 
-0.004*** 
0.191*** 
-0.050*** 
-0.021** 
-0.002 
-0.008 
-0.002** 
-0.077*** 
-0.004 
0.178*** 
      
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Panels A, B, and C present the results of estimating equation (8) with buy-and-hold stock 
returns as the dependent variable and A_CFO, A_DISCX, and A_PROD as the respective variables of interest. The 
columns RETt,t+3, RETt, RETt+1, RETt+2, and RETt+3 represent returns for periods t through t+3, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, 
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 4 
Discretionary Accruals and Future Firm Performance 
 
ROAi,t+j = α + β1DAit + β2TAit + β3CFOit + β4SGit + β5SIZEit + β6MTBit + β7IND_ROAit + 
β8RETit+j + β9SOXit+ β10DAit*SOXit + βk Controlsit * SOXit + ε                                                 (9) 
 
Dependent Variable         ROAt+1,t+3      ROAt+1      ROAt+2     ROAt+3 
DA -0.051*** -0.035*** -0.018* -0.001 
TA 1.161*** 0.501*** 0.329*** 0.311*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
DA*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
2.104*** 
0.030*** 
0.567*** 
0.025*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.269 
0.006 
0.022** 
-0.292*** 
0.802*** 
0.007*** 
0.162*** 
0.031*** 
-0.000 
-0.164** 
-0.023*** 
0.010* 
-0.040*** 
0.686*** 
0.011*** 
0.195*** 
0.005** 
-0.001** 
-0.080 
-0.002 
0.007 
-0.084*** 
0.581*** 
0.012*** 
0.235*** 
-0.011*** 
-0.000 
-0.080 
0.028*** 
0.016* 
-0.120*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (9) with return on assets as the dependent 
variable and DA as the variable of interest. The columns ROAt+1,t+3, ROAt+1, ROAt+2, and ROAt+3 represent the ROA 
for periods t+1 through t+3, t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all 
variables. 
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Table 5   
Market Pricing of Discretionary Accruals 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 ∗  𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 +                                       
                   𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗  𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛴 𝛽𝑘 ∗
                                   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘 ∗  𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                              (10) 
 
Dependent 
Variable   
          RETt,t+3 RETt      RETt+1      RETt+2 RETt+3 
DA 0.233*** 0.533*** -0.196*** -0.018 -0.13* 
CFO 2.432*** 1.528*** 1.425*** 0.927*** 0.388*** 
TA 1.107*** 0.204*** 0.182*** 0.102** 0.022 
SIZE 
SG 
MTB 
SOX 
DA*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.031*** 
0.344 
0.002 
0.027 
0.021 
-0.543*** 
-0.027*** 
0.962*** 
0.017*** 
0.349*** 
-0.150** 
0.052*** 
-0.006*** 
-0.380** 
-0.009*** 
-0.311*** 
0.165** 
0.332*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.244 
-0.004*** 
0.141*** 
0.011* 
-0.092*** 
-0.000 
-0.016 
-0.002*** 
-0.104*** 
0.008 
0.131*** 
      
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (10) with buy-and-hold stock returns as 
the dependent and DA as the variable of interest. DA is discretionary accruals and is calculated by estimating 
equation (7). The columns RETt,t+3, RETt, RETt+1, RETt+2, and RETt+3 represent returns for periods t through t+3, t, 
t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 6  
Future Return on Assets by Quintile of Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
 
Panel A – Pre-SOX 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh DAH – L 
Total  -0.04** 0.04 -0.08*** -0.04** 
REMLow -0.01 -0.08***  (896) 0.05***(2,689) -0.11***   (896) -0.03** 
REMMed 0.01 -0.02*  (2,688) 0.04**  (8,065) -0.06***   (2,689) -0.04** 
REMHigh -0.00 -0.07*** (896) 0.05***  (2,689) -0.09***  (896) -0.02** 
REMH - L 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01  
 
Panel B – Post-SOX 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh DAH – L 
Total  -0.06*** 0.02** -0.03** 0.03** 
REMLow 0.02** -0.05***  (921) 0.03*** (2,765) 0.04**  (921) 0.09*** 
REMMed 0.01 -0.04***  (2,765) 0.03***  (8,065) -0.02*  (2,765) 0.02** 
REMHigh -0.07*** -0.11***  (921) -0.04***  (2,765) -0.11***  (921) 0.00 
REMH – L -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.15***  
 
Effect of REM, Post-SOX – Pre-SOX: 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh 
REMH – L  -0.10*** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.17*** 
 
Effect of DA, Post-SOX – Pre-SOX: 
 Total REMLow REMMed REMHigh 
DAH – L 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.02** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests.  
The number of observations is in parentheses where applicable.  Table 6 presents the mean cumulative future ROA 
(ROAt+1,t+3,) conditional on levels of earnings management pre- and post-SOX. We split firms into quintiles based 
on yearly real and accrual earnings management ranks. We define observations in the highest (lowest) quintile of 
each type of earnings management as high (low). We define observations in the middle three quintiles of each type 
of earnings management as medium. The shaded total column (row) presents ROAt+1,t+3, conditional on real earnings 
management (discretionary accruals). The next three columns (rows) present ROAt+1,t+3, conditional on both real 
earnings management and discretionary accruals.  DAH-L (REMH-L) is defined as the difference in ROAt+1,t+3, for 
observations in the high quintile of discretionary accruals (real earnings management) and observations in the low 
quintile of discretionary accruals (real earnings management). Finally, in the Post-SOX – Pre-SOX panels, we 
compare ROAt+1,t+3, differences (DAH-L and REMH-L) across the pre- and post-SOX time periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Table 7  
Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns by Quintile of Accrual and Real Earnings 
Management 
 
 
Panel A – Pre-SOX 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh DAH – L 
Total  -0.11*** 0.02** 0.01 0.12*** 
REMLow -0.07*** -0.12***  (896) -0.08***(2,689) 0.01   (896) 0.13*** 
REMMed 0.00 -0.12***  (2,688) 0.04***  (8,065) 0.01   (2,689) 0.13*** 
REMHigh 0.02** -0.09*** (896) 0.05***  (2,689) 0.03**  (896) 0.12*** 
REMH - L 0.09*** 0.03** 0.13*** 0.02*  
 
Panel B – Post-SOX 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh DAH – L 
Total  -0.12*** 0.03** 0.04** 0.16*** 
REMLow 0.06*** -0.03**  (921) 0.07***  (2,765) 0.14***  (921) 0.17*** 
REMMed 0.03** -0.12***  (2,765) 0.07***  (8,065) 0.04**  (2,765) 0.16*** 
REMHigh -0.12*** -0.20***  (921) -0.11***  (2,765) -0.08***  (921) 0.12*** 
REMH - L -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.22***  
 
Effect of REM, Post-SOX – Pre-SOX: 
 Total DALow DAMed DAHigh 
REMH – L -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.31*** -0.24*** 
 
Effect of DA, Post-SOX – Pre-SOX: 
 Total REMLow REMMed REMHigh 
DAH – L 0.04** 0.04** 0.03** 0.00 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using one-tailed tests. 
The number of observations is in parentheses where applicable.  Table 7 presents cumulative stock returns (RETt,t+3,) 
conditional on levels of earnings management pre- and post-SOX. We split firms into quintiles based on yearly real 
and accrual earnings management ranks. We define observations in the highest (lowest) quintile of each type of 
earnings management as high (low). We define observations in the middle three quintiles of each type of earnings 
management as medium. The shaded total column (row) presents RETt,t+3, conditional on real earnings management 
(discretionary accruals). The next three columns (rows) present RETt,t+3, conditional on both real earnings 
management and discretionary accruals.  DAH-L (REMH-L) is defined as the difference in RETt,t+3, for observations in 
the high quintile of discretionary accruals (real earnings management) and observations in the low quintile of 
discretionary accruals (real earnings management). Finally, in the Post-SOX – Pre-SOX panels, we compare 
RETt,t+3, differences (DAH-L and REMH-L) across the pre- and post-SOX time periods. 
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Table 8 
Suspect Firms and Future Firm Performance 
 
Panel A 
DV       ROAt+1,t+3     ROAt+1,t+3     ROAt+1,t+3     ROAt+1,t+3 
DA -0.086***    
A_CFO  0.091***   
A_PROD   0.140  
A_DISCX    0.039** 
TA 1.001*** 0.770*** 0.943*** 1.131*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
DA*SOX (+) 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
1.994*** 
0.030*** 
0.565*** 
0.012*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.201 
0.009 
0.039*** 
 
 
 
-0.292*** 
2.714*** 
0.031*** 
0.615*** 
0.089*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.271* 
0.005 
 
-0.107*** 
 
 
-0.275*** 
2.113*** 
0.031*** 
0.667*** 
0.044*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.242 
0.009 
 
 
-0.124*** 
 
-0.244*** 
2.075*** 
0.031*** 
0.609*** 
0.027*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.259 
0.009 
 
 
 
-0.114*** 
-0.291*** 
 
Panel B 
Pre-SOX -0.03**  (1,250) 
Post-SOX -0.08***  (933) 
Post-Pre -0.05*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. We identify suspect firm years as years in which a firms earnings scaled by assets in the 
current year are 0.01 more than earnings scaled by assets from the prior year. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results 
of estimating equations (7) and (9) with return on assets as the dependent variable and DA, A_CFO, A_PROD, and 
A_DISCX as the variables of interest for suspect firm-year observations.  The columns ROAt+1,t+3, represent the ROA 
for periods t+1 through t+3. Panel B of Table 8 presents the three year return on assets in the pre- and post-SOX 
period for suspect firms. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 9  
Suspect Firms and Market Pricing of Earnings Management 
 
Panel A 
DV             RETt,t+3 RETt,t+3      RETt,t+3      RETt,t+3 
DA 0.201***    
A_CFO  0.160***   
A_PROD   0.155**  
A_DISCX    0.161*** 
CFO 2.433*** 2.110*** 1.056*** 1.641*** 
TA 1.116*** 0.517*** 0.774*** 0.589*** 
SIZE 
SG 
MTB 
SOX 
DA*SOX (-) 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.031*** 
0.343 
0.002 
0.029 
-0.056** 
 
 
 
-0.611*** 
-0.033*** 
0.391 
0.001 
0.047 
 
-0.256*** 
 
 
-0.722*** 
-0.041*** 
-0.395 
0.002*** 
0.072*** 
 
 
-0.219*** 
 
0.761*** 
-0.038*** 
0.387 
0.002** 
0.057** 
 
 
 
-0.244*** 
0.728*** 
 
 
Panel B 
Pre-SOX 0.02**  (1,250) 
Post-SOX -0.04**  (933) 
Post-Pre -0.06*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicator variables as well as 
SOX interactions with other control variables are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. We identify suspect firm years as years in which a firms earnings scaled by assets in the 
current year are 0.01 more than earnings scaled by assets from the prior year. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results 
of estimating equations (8) and (10) for suspect firms with Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns as the 
dependent and DA, A_CFO, A_PROD, and A_DISCX as the variables of interest. The columns RETt,t+3 represents 
returns for periods t through t+3. Panel B of Table 8 presents the cumulative abnormal return pre- and post-SOX for 
suspect firms. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Table 10  
Tobin’s Q and Earnings Management 
 
DV      Tobin’s Q     Tobin’s Q     Tobin’s Q     Tobin’s Q 
DA -1.179*    
A_CFO  2.969**   
A_PROD   0.583  
A_DISCX    1.714** 
TA 6.253* 11.27 11.18 10.42 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
DA*SOX (+) 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
4.121 
0.137** 
0.565*** 
0.012*** 
1.004*** 
-64.85 
-0.267 
2.927** 
 
 
 
-0.292*** 
5.138 
0.149 
0.615*** 
0.089*** 
1.003*** 
-64.98 
0.533 
 
-3.159** 
 
 
1.365*** 
3.913 
0.137** 
0.667*** 
0.044*** 
1.003*** 
-65.27 
-0.007 
 
 
-1.291* 
 
0.797** 
3.787 
0.229** 
0.609*** 
0.027*** 
1.012*** 
-64.44 
-0.116 
 
 
 
-2.919** 
1.262** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. We define Tobin’s Q as the market value of equity plus long-term debt divided by the book 
value of equity plus long-term debt. Table 10 presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and DA, A_CFO, A_PROD, and A_DISCX as the variables of interest. See 
Appendix A for detailed descriptions of the other variables. 
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Table 11  
ZSCORE and Earnings Management 
 
DV       ZSCORE     ZSCORE     ZSCORE     ZSCORE 
DA -0.477***    
A_CFO  0.421***   
A_PROD   1.949***  
A_DISCX    0.456*** 
TA 3.380*** 1.349*** 1.326*** 1.799*** 
CFO 
SIZE 
IND_ROA 
RETURN 
MTB 
SG 
SOX 
DA*SOX (-) 
A_CFO*SOX (-) 
A_PROD*SOX (-) 
A_DISCX*SOX (-) 
INTERCEPT 
2.479*** 
0.073*** 
0.244*** 
0.122*** 
-0.002 
-0.579* 
0.099*** 
0.390*** 
 
 
 
1.775*** 
2.872*** 
0.068*** 
0.212*** 
0.138*** 
-0.001 
-0.602** 
-0.229*** 
 
-0.485*** 
 
 
1.670*** 
2.506*** 
0.033*** 
0.261*** 
0.129*** 
0.002 
-0.920*** 
-0.164 
 
 
-1.519*** 
 
1.372*** 
2.826*** 
0.034*** 
0.196*** 
0.138*** 
-0.005** 
-0.794** 
-0.154** 
 
 
 
-1.045*** 
1.480*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. We define ZSCORE as  Altman (1968) Z-score. Table 11 presents the results of an ordinary 
least squares regression that uses ZSCORE as the dependent variable and DA, A_CFO, A_PROD, and A_DISCX as 
the variables of interest. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of the other variables. 
 
